Objective
=========

The rapid adoption of health information technology (IT) coupled with growing reports of ransomware, and hacking has made cybersecurity a priority in health care. This study leverages federal data in order to better understand current cybersecurity threats in the context of health IT.

BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
===========================

The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act of 2009 increased electronic medical record (EMR) adoption across the country, making health IT security a growing concern for health care organizations.[@ooy019-B1] Indeed, cybersecurity has become a priority in health care because of the highly sensitive nature of patient information, the prevalence of large databases of diverse health data, and the development of highly interconnected medical and health information technologies.[@ooy019-B2] With growing reports of ransomware and other deliberate hacking activities initiated by unauthorized users, there is a need for data-driven approaches to better understand the extent of these threats to the health care system.[@ooy019-B3]

The HITECH Act requires that health care organizations publicly report all breaches of protected health information involving more than 500 patients to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office for Civil Rights (OCR).[@ooy019-B4] To our knowledge, a formal analysis of cybersecurity breaches nationwide with a focus on EMR and hacking-related incidents has not been performed.[@ooy019-B5]^,^[@ooy019-B6] This study leverages publicly available regulatory data in order to better understand the current state of cybersecurity and to identify opportunities to make health IT safer and more secure.

MATERIALS AND METHODS
=====================

Data collection, definition, and classification
-----------------------------------------------

This was a cross-sectional study of all available reported data breaches in the United States between 2013 and 2017, which was downloaded from the HHS OCR Breach Portal website in comma-separated values file format.[@ooy019-B7] Data for each reported breach included information about the breached covered entity, breach submission date, breach state, number of affected patient records, media type, and data breach category.

Consistent with the classifications used in the HHS OCR dataset and in prior research, media type categories were defined as follows: portable electronic device or laptop; desktop, email or EMR; paper; network server; multiple types (if a breach listed more than one media type); and other/unknown.[@ooy019-B5] Similarly, breach categories were defined as follows: theft; loss or improper disposal; unauthorized access or disclosure; hacking or IT incident; multiple categories (if a breach listed more than one breach category); and other/unknown.[@ooy019-B5] Finally, covered entities were categorized as either health plans (eg, health insurance companies), health care providers (eg, physicians, hospitals), or other (eg, business associate, health care clearing house, unknown). A simple Python program was developed to identify and classify EMR-related breaches described in the breach media type field, as well as to identify and classify hacking-related breaches contained in the breach category field.

Adjusted (per capita) breach characteristics were calculated by dividing state-level totals for number of breaches and records affected, respectively, by information from two additional publicly available federal databases: (1) 2017 state population estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau and (2) estimated physician totals aggregated by state as listed in the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) 2016 Compendium of U.S. Health Systems.[@ooy019-B5]

Statistical analysis and data visualization
-------------------------------------------

Summary statistics were collected as frequencies and percentages for number of breaches and number of affected patient records, stratified by covered entity, breach media type, breach category, and breach state. Differences in the distribution of reported data breaches by covered entity category were evaluated using the chi-square test. A *P*-value \<.05 was considered significant for all analyses, which were performed using Microsoft Excel Version 14.2.0 (Redmond, WA, USA) and open source statistical software PSPP Version 1.0.1.[@ooy019-B8] State-level breach characteristics were visualized for the contiguous United States and the District of Columbia using Plotly choropleth maps generated in Python.

RESULTS
=======

General characteristics of data breaches
----------------------------------------

Over the 5-year study period, there were 1512 reported data breaches of protected health information affecting 154 415 257 patient records ([Table 1](#ooy019-T1){ref-type="table"}). This included 215 (14.2%) health plan breaches, 1073 (71.0%) breaches of a hospital or health care provider, and 224 (14.8%) breaches involving other (170 business associate, 2 health care clearing house, 52 unknown). Furthermore, there were 106 355 237 (68.9%) patient records affected due to health plan breaches, 30 760 502 (19.9%) records affected by hospital or health care provider breaches, and 17 299 518 (11.2%) patient records affected from other (17 131 045 business associate; 6504 health care clearing house; 161 969 unknown). State-level trends in breach characteristics were calculated and visualized after adjusting by population estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau ([Figure 1](#ooy019-F1){ref-type="fig"}) and by physician totals provided by the AHRQ Compendium of U.S. Health Systems ([Figure 2](#ooy019-F2){ref-type="fig"}). Table 1.Characteristics of reported data breaches of protected health information by covered entity, 2013--2017Characteristic20132014201520162017Reported data breaches, *n* (%)[\*](#tblfn1){ref-type="table-fn"} Health plan17 (6.1)38 (12.1)62 (23.0)51 (15.6)47 (14.5) Health care provider184 (66.2)180 (57.3)194 (72.1)256 (78.3)259 (79.9) Other77 (27.7)96 (30.6)13 (4.8)20 (6.1)18 (5.6)Patient records affected, *n* (%) Health plan88549 (1.3)2135600 (16.8)102919905 (90.9)880455 (5.3)330728 (6.8) Health care provider5773597 (83.2)2051214 (16.2)6392806 (5.6)12213969 (73.3)4328916 (88.9) Other1078487 (15.5)8496026 (67.0)3954463 (3.5)3560666 (21.4)209876 (4.3)[^1]
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Hacking incidents and EMR-related breaches of protected health information
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

There were 128 breaches involving EMRs which affected a total of 4 867 920 patient records, in contrast to 1384 non-EMR-related breaches involving 149 547 337 patient records. In addition, there were a total of 363 breaches classified as hacking incidents which involved 130 702 378 patient records, in contrast to 1149 breaches that were not hacking-related but impacted 23 712 879 records. The breakdown of hacking-related data breaches by media type, as well as EMR breaches according to breach category, are shown in [Table 2](#ooy019-T2){ref-type="table"}. By media type, network server incidents made up more than 50% of all hacking-related breaches of protected health information, affecting more than 90% of hacking-related patient records and more than 75% of breached patient records overall. Furthermore, the majority (87%) of patient records affected by EMR-related breaches were due to hacking incidents ([Table 2](#ooy019-T2){ref-type="table"}). Table 2.Breakdown of hacking and EMR-related breaches Breaches, *n* (%)Records affected, *n* (%)Hacking-related breaches by media type Portable electronic device or laptop1 (0.3)1911 (0.0) Desktop, email, or EMR106 (29.2)1984418 (1.5) Network server192 (52.9)119590428 (91.5) Multiple types48 (13.2)8822024 (6.7) Other/unknown16 (4.4)303597 (0.2)EMR-related breaches by breach category Theft21 (16.4)146496 (3.0) Unauthorized access or disclosure66 (51.6)377088 (7.7) Hacking or IT incident34 (26.6)4240218 (87.1) Multiple categories5 (3.9)102614 (2.1) Other/unknown2 (1.6)1504 (0.0)[^2]

DISCUSSION
==========

Health IT cybersecurity is a serious issue, with millions of individuals across the country already affected by cybersecurity breaches each year. Hacking incidents are becoming a very real concern because cyberattacks can lock down health systems and directly hinder patient care.[@ooy019-B9] Despite making up less than 25% of all breaches, hacking was responsible for nearly 85% of all affected patient records over the last 5 years, highlighting the broad potential reach of this kind of breach. The 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack on Britain's National Health Service, which forced numerous clinics to close their doors and refuse patient care, further highlights just how devastating a single cyberattack can be simply because of outdated hospital IT systems and infrastructure.[@ooy019-B9] Because ransomware is a relatively new and complex phenomenon in the published literature, it will be important to make data, information, and solutions addressing ransomware easily accessible to the public and to informatics researchers.[@ooy019-B10]^,^[@ooy019-B11]

Covered entities play an important role in the scale of breaches, with most reported data breaches occurring in the hospital and health care provider settings, while the largest volume of affected patient records comes from the health plan setting, consistent with the local/regional nature of most hospitals and the national scope of most health plans (eg, the 2015 Anthem breach of 78 million records), respectively. These breaches can have a serious financial impact on organizations, with some cost estimates as high as \$355 per breached patient record.[@ooy019-B12] Furthermore, in addition to disrupting physician and other health care provider workflows, EMR breaches may encourage patients to withhold critical information from their providers out of privacy concerns, further impacting the quality of care patients receive.[@ooy019-B13] As diverse software companies (eg, Google, Apple, Microsoft, Amazon) known for handling large amounts of user data enter the health care space, it will be useful to see how the growing number of business associates and related covered entities further alter the national landscape of cybersecurity breaches.[@ooy019-B14]

Recently implemented health IT policies provide further insight into the current and future risks of health IT cybersecurity breaches. The HITECH Act helped drive rapid adoption of EMRs nationwide, but existing certification criteria focused heavily on Meaningful Use functionality without equal attention to patient privacy and security, usability, or interoperability.[@ooy019-B15] The Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT recently described its plans to (1) reduce random surveillance of certified products and (2) replace more than half of formal health IT certification test procedures with simple vendor self-declaration raising concerns from both the medical and informatics communities.[@ooy019-B16]^,^[@ooy019-B17] Finally, laws such as the 21st Century Cures Act passed in 2016 will catalyze new cancer and precision medicine initiatives, but also formally remove EMRs and other health IT from U.S. Food and Drug Administration regulatory oversight, creating the need for new ways to monitor the safety, effectiveness, and security of health IT.[@ooy019-B18] As new policies affecting health IT and cybersecurity continue to be implemented, the informatics community must provide evidence-based, data-driven expertise, and leadership to support these initiatives and protect patients.

The heterogeneous distribution of breaches and breached records across the country, even after adjusting for state resident and physician populations, reflects the fragmented state of cybersecurity measures currently in place.[@ooy019-B19]^,^[@ooy019-B20] The scientific community has recognized that health care organizations are seriously unprepared for cyber threats, due to the strong focus on health IT adoption without similar attention to security, leading to systems that are both highly interconnected and vulnerable to cyberattacks.[@ooy019-B10] Indeed, cybersecurity issues easily become serious patient safety concerns: the health IT infrastructure provides a robust medium for problems to propagate throughout large populations, while many technologies (eg, drug infusion devices) contain software flaws that could be exploited by malicious users to directly impact clinical care.[@ooy019-B18]^,^[@ooy019-B21] Serious consequences range from patient identify theft to inhibited patient care (via EMR ransomware) to direct patient harm (via unauthorized control of devices).[@ooy019-B22] While organizations may already have disaster mitigation procedures for unplanned system downtime, specific resources must also be devoted to preventing cybersecurity threats from posing a risk to patient safety.

Effective solutions to reduce cybersecurity vulnerabilities are broad and will require engagement at multiple levels. At the individual level, physicians and other health care providers must follow good data and cyber hygiene, which includes creating, updating, and protecting strong passwords as well as remaining vigilant against cybersecurity threats like email phishing.[@ooy019-B6]^,^[@ooy019-B22] Similarly, at the organizational level, institutions must have sufficient IT resources to implement robust user authentication, strong data encryption, and frequent software updates (for technologies ranging from EMRs to operating systems).[@ooy019-B3]^,^[@ooy019-B19]^,^[@ooy019-B23] Finally, as big data, machine learning, and artificial intelligence are integrated into the practice of medicine, policies must be revised to help build the informatics infrastructure necessary to safely and effectively monitor, detect, and eliminate cyber threats.[@ooy019-B20]^,^[@ooy019-B24] In the context of the current regulatory landscape, our findings highlight a critical need to strengthen key administrative, physical, and technical safeguards for health IT cybersecurity.[@ooy019-B4]^,^[@ooy019-B14]

Our study had several limitations. First, the number of breaches and affected records were likely underestimated, since only breaches that affected more than 500 individuals were reported to the HHS database. Second, while we quantified the number of breaches and patient records affected, there were insufficient details on each breach to determine the underlying factors (eg, human, technical, and policy) that would explain yearly breach fluctuations in greater depth. Finally, while our analysis addressed several important covered entities, future studies should also focus on the characteristics of business associates and related organizations as this data becomes available. Despite these limitations, the HHS breach dataset currently represents the most comprehensive database of reported breaches and provides a valuable snapshot of important trends in breach characteristics at a national level.

CONCLUSION
==========

Cybersecurity breaches of protected health information are a serious problem that currently affects millions of patients nationwide. Hacking-related breaches, particularly involving health IT and ransomware, are a rapidly growing concern. As we work towards an interconnected learning health system focused on personalized and precision medicine, it will be crucial that our future informatics infrastructure is designed to be simultaneously effective, safe, and secure.
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[^1]: *P* \< .001.
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